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the task of the state legislature in this area becomes one of raising the
educational standards of those receiving substandard educations to a
level where they will be adequately educated, while at the same time
not appreciably lowering the higher educational standards achieved by
others.
Vasilis C. Katsafanas
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE-USE OF SEX-DESIGNATED CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING COLUMN
HEADINGS- The Supreme Court has held that a municipal ordinance
construed to forbid sex-designated classified advertising column headings
does not violate newspaper publisher's first amendment rights.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
On October 9, 1969, the National Organization for Women, Inc. filed
a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations al-
leging that the Pittsburgh Press Company had violated the Pittsburgh
Human Relations Ordinance' by the use of sex-designated classified ad-
vertising column headings. 2 After conducting public hearings," the
Commission found the ordinance had been violated by this practice and
issued a cease and desist order.4 On appeal, the commonwealth court
affirmed a modified order.5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
review, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. 6
1. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 75 § 8(j), Feb. 27, 1967, as amended, Ordinance
395, July 3, 1969, which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice .... [f]or any person, whether or not
an employer, employment agency, or labor organization, to aid . . .or participate
in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice of this ordi-
nance . . .or to attempt to directly or indirectly oommit any act declared by this
ordinance to be an unlawful employment practice.
2. Prior to October, 1969, the Pittsburgh Press headed its classified advertising col-
umns, "Help Wanted Male," "Help Wanted Female," and "Male-Female Help Wanted."
After the complaint was filed, but prior to judgment, it adopted the designations "Jobs-
Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," "Male-Female." See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379-80 (1973).
3. After a complaint is filed with the Commission, public hearings are held pursuant
to Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 75 §§ 13(g), (h), (i) Feb. 27, 1967, in order to determine
if the ordinance has been violated.
4. Order of Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, July 28, 1970.
5. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448,
287 A.2d 161 (1972). The commonwealth court limited the order of the Commission to
advertising for employment which was not exempt or excluded from the ordinance.
6. 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
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Affirming the decision, 7 the Court held that classified advertising head-
ings are commercial speech" not protected by the first amendment.9
Initially, the Court reiterated that the first amendment does not pro-
vide the press with an absolute protection from regulation. 10 Thus,
regulation has been allowed where a newspaper's operation was not
endangered."' For example, the Sherman Act'2 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act 13 have been applied to newspapers. The Court in Pitts-
burgh Press stated that the ordinance in question did not threaten the
financial viability of the newspaper or its ability to function as a vehicle
for free expression, 4 and was allowable. The Court next turned to the
impact of the ordinance on publication of the newspaper. The Court
relied heavily on precedent which draws a distinction between com-
mercial and editorial speech. In the leading case, Valentine v. Chresten-
sen,15 respondent sought first amendment protection to avoid a city
anti-litter ordinance. Because its sole purpose was to avoid application
of the ordinance, the Court held that political protest contained in the
commercial leaflet was insufficient to require Constitutional protections
for the commercial advertising found in the same leaflet.16 It reasoned
that the first amendment does not protect such commercial speech.' 7
Because the advertising in Pittsburgh Press constituted proposals for
employment, the Court applying Chrestensen, stated that there was an
insufficient showing of a distinction between the advertising and the
column headings to require separate treatment under the first amend-
ment.'8
7. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
(Burger, CJ., Douglas, Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 385.
9. Id. at 384-85.
10. Id. at 381-82.
11. In the following, regulation was not allowed: Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1948):
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
12. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (where the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970), was applied prohibiting petitioner from contracting with a Canadian
press association to furnish news items exclusively to each other).
13. In Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946), the Court allowed
application of the overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1970), to respondent, a publisher of a daily newspaper.
14. 413 U.S. at 383.
15. 316 US. 52 (1942).
16. Id. at 55.
[ .. T]he .. . facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against
official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and for the purpose,
of evading the prohibition of the Ordinance.
17. Id. at 54. ". . . [Tihe Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."
18. 413 U.S. at 387-88. The Court apparently rejected the idea that the newspaper's
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Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Commission's order
constituted an impermissible prior restraint on expression.' 9 It found
that the order was narrow and was based on systematic, repetitive con-
duct;2 0 not speculation as to the effect of the captions.
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart rejected the application of
the Chrestensen doctrine to these facts, saying that it had no application
to the advertising pages of a newspaper. He argued that the exercise
of judgment regarding column headings is a matter of editorial policy
worthy of protection by the first amendment.2' For him, the majority
decision allowed the government far too much control over the publica-
tion of newspapers.2
The Court's use of the commercial speech doctrine in the present
case is not surprising since it has acknowledged the viability of the
editorial-commercial distinction consistently for three decades since
Chrestensen. The Chrestensen distinction was formulated in terms of
pure commercial speech 23 and is based on the theory that the first
amendment was intended primarily to protect discussion of public is-
sues.2 Even though there is some constitutional history indicating
disclaimer which preceded the columns in question separated the column headings from
the advertising itself. The disclaimer appeared as follows:
Notice to Job Seekers:
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience of our
readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex
than the other. Various laws and ordinances-local, state and federal, prohibit discrimi-
nation in employment because of sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational require-
ment. Unless the advertisement itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should
assume that the advertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compliance with
the laws against discrimination.
Id. at 381 n.7.
19. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Court struck down an ordinance for-
bidding publication of any scandalous or malicious information without good motive on
the ground that pre-publication regulations unduly burden the press. The interests of
those individuals involved are sufficiently protected in post publication actions, e.g., crimi-
nal sanctions or private damages.
20. 413 U.S. at 390. The Press had followed the practice of using sex-designated column
headings for years and deemed it desirable; thus the Court felt it did not have to guess
as to future conduct or the effect of this practice.
21. Id. at 401.
22. Id. at 402-03.
S. . T]he Court approves today . . . a government order dictating to a publisher
in advance how he must arrange the layout of pages in his newspaper.
23. See note 17 supra.
24. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
717 (1931). Both of these first amendment cases rely on a letter written in 1774 by the
Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, urging support for the colonists.
The last right we mention regards freedom of the press. The importance of this con-
sists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality and arts in general, in its
diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of government, its ready com-
munication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union
1002
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broader goals,2 5 one noted commentator views the first amendment as
essential to the functioning of a democratic system and sees its protec-
tions attaching only to free expression which is related to the process
of government.2 6
Nonetheless, the editorial-commercial dichotomy is questionable for
two reasons. The distinction has little basis in first amendment theory.
In addition, the flexibility in its application could result in uncertainty
as to its application.
Even though there was ample precedent for the Court to rely on its
decision, the commercial speech doctrine is not a theory explicitly de-
manded by the Constitution. The langauge of the first amendment
27
does not necessarily afford greater protection to political thoughts than
it does economic considerations.2 8 The expression protected by the
theory of the first amendment should include not only great literature
but also thoughts and writings an individual confronts in everyday life,
even though it may not seem to have great societal value. This is even
reflected in Miller v. California29 where the Court recently promul-
gated a three-pronged obscenity test. Under this test, the first amend-
ment protects works which do not lack "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value."8' 0 Miller indicates that the protections of the
among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honor-
able and just modes of conducting affairs.
I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774).
25. In his concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), Mr. Justice
Black examines Thomas Jefferson's view of the first amendment.
Thomas Jefferson's views of the breadth of the First Amendment's prohibition against
abridgment of speech and press by the federal government are illustrated by the fol-
lowing statement he made in 1789. 'The first amendment thereby guards in the same
sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the
press: insomuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers
the other, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false
religion, are withheld from the cognizance of the federal tribunals.'
Id. at 157-58 n.2.
26. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
The First Amendment ...protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but
with a public power, a governmental responsibility.
Id. at 255.
27. "Congress shall make no law .... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
28. See Gardner, Free Speech In Public Places, 36 Bosr. L. REV. 239 (1956):
The Constitution does not discriminate between different liberties. It leaves all liber-
ties to compete for men's allegiance in a free field. In that competition the salesman
has the same opportunity as the preacher, the scientist, the engineer, the soldier, and
the politician ....
Id. at 24647.
29. 413 U.S. 15 (1975).
30. Id. at 24. "The basic guidelines for the tryer of fact must be . . .whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
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first amendment apply despite the general topic area of the expression,
its correctness or its popularity. Similarly, in Winters v. New York,3 1
the Court rejected the proposition that relative societal value of a liter-
ary publication is a relevant criterion in determining the applicability
of the first amendment.32 The first amendment thus has been inter-
preted as extending to numerous areas of non-political expression.
Because commercially-oriented speech may aid individual choice in
economic areasa3 it seems incorrect to suggest that commercial speech
should never be protected by the first amendment.
It is true that the Court has stated certain kinds of speech are not
protected by the first amendment. For example, although often criti-
cized, 4 the theory that exposure to pornographic material leads to anti-
social conduct is reflected in the Court's obscenity decisions.35 Another
example is Beauharnais v. Illinois," where the Court was faced with
publication of racial slurs. It allowed prosecution for criminal libel
due to the potential for disruption caused by the publication.37 Fur-
ther, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,38 the underlying rationale for
the exclusion of "fighting words" from first amendment protection is
that by their very nature they produce reactionary conduct and have
31. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
32. Id. at 510. "Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these
magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of litera-
ture."
33. See Redish, Commercial Speech and Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1970):
By providing the consuming public information, commercial speech aids in the at-
tainment and, more importantly, helps the individual to rationally plan his life to
achieve the maximum satisfaction possible within the reach of his resources. In doing
so it serves an important function as a catalyst in the achievement of personal self-
realization.
Id. at 472.
34. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBscENrry AN PORNOGRAPHY 27 (1970), which stated:
In sum, empirical research designed to clarify the question has found no evidence to
date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in the causa-
tion of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults.
35. Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), which stated:
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between anti-social behavior and
obscene material the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that
such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this Court implicitly ac-
cepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect 'the
social interest in order and morality.'
Id. at 60-61.
36. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
37. Id. at 259.
... [W]ilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote
strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free,
ordered life in a metropolitan, polygot community.
38. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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slight value as an expression of ideas.39 Nevertheless, while there may
be a strong societal interest in order and a sense of morality which
necessitates control of obscenity, libel and "fighting words, '40 this inter-
est would not seem applicable to commercial speech since it does not
inherently threaten disruption.
Moreover, the scope of the commercial speech doctrine is unclear.
Under the Court's current flexible approach to commercial speech,
speech does not necessarily lose the protections of the first amendment
merely because it has some commercial aspects. Printed material con-
cerning religious activity is not subject to prohibition even though it is
sold.41 Advertisements which express ideas and convey information con-
tinue to enjoy first amendment protections.42 The Court, however, has
allowed local prohibition of door-to-door solicitation of magazine sub-
scriptions. 43 Thus, the Court's effort to delineate the parameters of
purely commercial speech could lead to some confusion and uncer-
tainty which may produce a chilling effect on expression if a publisher
desiring to express an idea is reluctant to do so because there is some
commercial aspect present which could make first amendment protec-
tion inapplicable.
If the commercial speech doctrine were abandoned, what approach
should be used? The absolutist view of the first amendment has never
been accepted by a majority of the Court.4 4 Rather, the Court usually
seeks to weigh the competing interests by considering not only the
necessity of the free flow of information, but also the aims of the legis-
lation in question and the social policy behind it.45 Where the legisla-
39. Earlier, the Court used this same rationale in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution." Id. at 309-10.
40. 315 U.S. at 572.
41. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1942).
42. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1963).
43. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1950). The Court found a valid exercise of
police power where communities deemed such sales to be obnoxious.
It would be, it seems to us, a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free
press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit the solicitors of publica-
tions to the home premises of its residents.
Id. at 645.
44. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HAIv. L. REV. 1 (1965), which said:
• .. [T]he absolute view has not prevailed within the Court. A majority of the Jus-
tices from time to time have recognized some contexts in which government has power
to curb speech as such.
Id. at 5.
45. The Court has expressed various methods of balancing the conflicting values in the
area of the first amendment. For example: Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968):
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tion is based on a paramount state interest which outweighs a societal
need for the free dissemination of ideas, its regulatory effect is allow-
able.46 Thus, in weighing the state interest in the Pittsburgh Press case,
the Court following this approach would have considered the impact
of sex-discrimination in employment practices on society,47 and the
relationship between sex-discrimination in employment and sex-
designated classified advertising.
An alternative approach the Court could have used would have been
to treat the column headings as conduct rather than speech. Because
the Court has consistently rejected the proposition that pure speech
and conduct should be treated identically under the first amend-
ment,48 it would have been necessary to distinguish between discussion
In determining whether the state has the power to place such unequal burdens on
minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court have
consistently held that only a compelling state interest in regulation of a subject within
the State's Constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting first amendment free-
doms.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
... [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the Constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ....
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1969):
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state may pre-
vail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.... [Hjere the
question is ...whether the State has demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining
and making public the membership lists of these organizations as to justify the sub-
stantial abridgement of associational freedom which such disclosures will affect.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958):
We hold immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
[NAACP] claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the mem-
bership to pursue their private interests privately and to associate freely with others
in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment [and the
first amendment]. And we conclude that Alabama has fallen short of showing a con-
trolling justification for the deterrent effect on free enjoyment of the right to associate
which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have.
46. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971), a case involving news reporters' divul-
gence of confidential sources, the Burger Court used this type of test in holding the first
amendment does not require such a privilege from divulgence where the state shows an
overriding interest.
47. With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970),
.. Federal positive law now includes a provision that had been desired for many years
by those who were concerned with the economic, social, and political status of American
women ... ." L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 105 (1970).
Although the ultimate impact of this type of federal, as well as state, legislation is as yet
unknown, by protecting a woman's right to obtain and hold a job previously denied on
the basis of sex, a momentum has been created in American society demanding a re-exami-
nation of traditional female/male roles.
48. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas
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or advocacy of the desirability of sex-discrimination in employment as
a societal policy, and conduct which actually encourages it.49 Put an-
other way, the discussion of ideas should be protected, but action may
or may not be protected, depending on its effect. In the Pittsburg Press
case, the Court rejected the idea that classified advertising column
headings reflect editorial policy of the newspaper.50 Therefore, because
these classified advertising column headings might not constitute pure
speech at all, the headings must be analyzed in order to determine
proper Constitutional treatment.
In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 51 the Court allowed a state
anti-trade restraint statute to be applied to union pickets who were
attempting to end a company's policy of selling to non-union distribu-
tors, even though such an agreement was prohibited by law.5 2 In deny-
ing first amendment protection to this activity, the Court stressed the
existence of conduct in violation of a state statute.53 The Court rejected
the idea that the first amendment protections 6xtend to a course of
conduct merely because it was initiated by speech or writing. 54 Analo-
gously, because in Pittsburgh Press, sex discrimination in employement
was found to violate the Human Relations Ordinance,5 the want-ads
and the column headings,56 by promoting the act of seeking employ-
ment, clearly encouraged violation of the ordinance. Thus regulation
of both would appear allowable.
The Court could have abandoned the commercial speech doctrine in
by conduct .. . as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech.
Id. at 555.
49. The Court reaffirmed this principal in a case involving student protests by stating:
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the permissibility of regulation is
the line between mere advocacy and "advocacy directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action . . . and likely to produce such action."
Healy v. James, 408 US. 169, 189 (1972).
50. 413 US. at 385.
51. 336 US. 490 (1949).
52. Id. at 492-93.
53. Id. at 498.
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in viola-
tion of a valid criminal statute. We reject the contention now.
54. Id. at 502.
It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were ... brought about
through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of free-
dom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.
55. 413 US. at 388.
56. See note 18 supra. The Court refused to separate the column headings from the
want-ads for first amendment treatment.
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this case. At least two alternatives consistent with traditional first
amendment analysis were available. The first was an analysis of whether
the Human Relations Ordinance reflects a compelling governmental
interest, making regulation of the column headings allowable. Sec-
ondly, the Court could have concluded that the column headings repre-
sented conduct and not expression and thus were not protected by the
first amendment. Either would allow the Court a wider range of in-
quiry in order to insure greater protection of the exchange of ideas and
at the same time, permit governmental regulation where there is a
great societal need.
Ellen Edge Katz
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AND TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS-The
United States Supreme Court has held the regulations of the California
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control which prohibit certain
sexual acts and the display of specific parts of the body, as entertain-
ment in licensed establishments, do not, on their faces, violate the
United States Constitution.
California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
In 1965, a dancer in a California nightclub entertained with her breasts
exposed. The Supreme Court of California in In Re Giannini held
that she could not be convicted of either lewd conduct or indecent ex-
posure in the absence of proof that her dance was obscene. The Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Beverage Control, which is the administrative agency
vested by the California constitution2 with primary authority for li-
censing and regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages within the state,
became concerned in the years following Giannini with the progression
from "topless" dancers to "bottomless" dancers, nude entertainers, and
the showing of films displaying sexual acts in bars and nightclubs
1. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, cert. denied, 395 US. 910 (1968).
2. CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 22. That section provides in part:
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall have the exclusive power, except
as herein provided and in accordance with the laws enacted by the Legislature, to
license the manufacture, importation and sales of alcoholic beverages in this State.
. . . The Department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend, or
revoke any specific alcoholic beverages license if it shall determine for good cause that
the granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare or
morals ....
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